How to Steal a Botnet and What Can Happen When You Do by Kemmerer, Richard
How to Steal a Botnet and What 
Can Happen When You Do
Security Group
Department of Computer Science
University of California, Santa Barbara
kemm@cs.ucsb.edu
DIMVA  2009                                                                                                               July 9, 2009
Richard A. Kemmerer
UC Santa Barbara
2
Botnet Terminology
• Bot
– an application that performs some action or set of actions on behalf 
of a remote controller
– installed on a victim machine (zombie)
– modular (plug in your functionality/exploit/payload)
• Botnet
– network of infected machines controlled by a malicious entity
• Control channel
– required to send commands to bots and obtain results and status 
messages
– usually via IRC, HTTP, HTTPs, or Peer-to-Peer
• Bot Herder
– aka botmaster or controller
– owns control channel, sends commands to botnet army
– motivations are usually power or money 
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Torpig
• Trojan horse
– distributed via the Mebroot “malware platform”
– injects itself into 29 different applications as DLL
– steals sensitive information (passwords, HTTP POST data)
– HTTP injection for phishing
– uses “encrypted” HTTP as C&C protocol
– uses domain flux to locate C&C server
• Mebroot
– spreads via drive-by downloads
– sophisticated rootkit (overwrites master boot record)
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Innocent victim
Torpig C&C
“Hacked” web servers
Injection server
Mebroot C&C
“Drive-By Download” server
Torpig: Behind the scenes
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Torpig HTML Injection
• Domains of interest (~300) stored in configuration file
• When domain of interest visited
– Torpig issues request to injection server
– server specifies a trigger page on target domain and a URL 
on injection server to be visited when user visits trigger page
• When user visits the trigger page
– Torpig requests injection URL from injection server
– Torpig injects the returned content into the user’s browser
• Content is usually html phishing form that asks for 
sensitive data
– reproduces look and style of target web site
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Example Phishing Page
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Example Phishing Page
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Domain Flux
• Taking down a single bot has little effect on botmaster
• C&C servers are vulnerable to take down
– if you use a static IP address, people will block or remove host
– if you use a DNS name, people will block or remove domain name
• Domain flux
– idea is to have bots periodically generate new C&C domain names
– often, use local date (system time) as input
– botmaster needs to register one of these domains
and respond properly so that bots recognize valid C&C server
– defenders must register all domains to take down botnet
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Torpig Domain Flux
• Each bot has
– same domain generation algorithm (DGA) 
– three fixed domains to be used if all else fails
• DGA generates 
– weekly domain name (wd)
– daily domain name (dd)
• Every 20 minutes bot attempts to connect (in order) to
– wd.com, wd.net, wd.biz
– if all three fail, then dd.com, dd.net, dd.biz
– if they also fail, then the three fixed domains
• Criminals normally registered wd.com (and wd.net)
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Sinkholing Torpig C&C Overview
• Reverse engineered name generation algorithm and 
C&C protocol
• Observed domains for 01/25 – 02/15 unregistered
• Registered these domains ourselves
• Unfortunately, Mebroot pushed new Torpig binary on 
02/04
• We controlled the botnet for ~10 days
• Data
– 8.7 GB Apache logs
– 69 GB pcap data (contains stolen information)
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Sinkholing Torpig C&C
• Purchased hosting from two different hosting 
providers known to be unresponsive to complaints
• Registered wd.com and wd.net with two different 
registrars
– One was suspended 01/31 due to abuse complaint
• Set up Apache web servers to receive bot requests
• Recorded all network traffic
• Automatically downloaded and removed data from 
our hosting providers
• Enabled hosts a week early 
– immediately received data from 359 infected machines
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Data Collection Principles
• Principle 1: the sinkholed botnet should be operated 
so that any harm and/or damage to victims and targets 
of attacks would be minimized
– always responded with okn message
– never sent new/blank configuration file
– removed data from servers regularly
– stored data offline in encrypted form
• Principle 2: the sinkholed botnet should collect enough 
information to enable notification and remediation of 
affected parties
– worked with law enforcement (FBI and DoD Cybercrime units)
– worked with bank security officers
– worked with ISPs
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Data Collection
• Bot connects to Torpig C&C every 20 minutes via 
HTTP POST
• Sends a header
– timestamp, IP address, proxy ports, OS version, locale, nid, 
Torpig build and version number
• nid 
– 8 byte value, used for encrypting header and data
– derived from hard disk information or volume serial number
– serves as a convenient, unique identifier
– allows one to detect VMware machines
• Optional body data
– stolen information (accounts, browser data, …) 
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Size Estimation
• Count number of infections
– usually  based on unique IP addresses
– problematic: DHCP and NAT effects (we saw 1.2M unique IPs) 
– our count based on header information: ~180K hosts (nids) seen
Average 4,690 new IPs Average 705 new nids
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Size Estimation
• Cummulative number of infections
– linear for unique IP addresses
– decayed quickly for unique nids
– more than 75% of unique nids were observed in first 48 hours
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Threats
• Theft of financial data
• Denial of service
• Proxy servers
• Privacy threats
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Threats: Theft of Financial Information
• 8,310 unique accounts from 410 financial institutions
– Top 5:   PayPal (1,770), Poste Italiane, Capital One, E*Trade, 
Chase
– 38% of credentials stolen from browser’s password manager
• 1,660 credit cards
– Top 5: Visa (1,056), Mastercard, American Express, Maestro, 
Discover
– US (49%), Italy (12%), Spain (8%) 
– typically, one CC per victim, but there are exceptions …
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Value of the Financial Information
• Symantec [2008] estimates
– Credit card value at $.10 to $25.00
– Bank account at $10.00 to $1,000.00
• Using Symantec estimates,10 days of Torpig data 
valued at $83K to $8.3M
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Threats: Denial of Service
• More than 60,000 active hosts at any given time
• Determine network speed from ip2location DB
– cable and DSL make up 65% of infected hosts
– used 435 kbps conservative upstream bandwidth
– yields greater than 17 Gbps just from DSL/cable
– corporate networks make up 22% of infected hosts
• Potential for a massive DDOS attack
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Threats: Proxy Servers
• Torpig opens SOCKS and HTTP proxy
• 20% of infected machines are publicly reachable
• Only 2.45% of those marked by Spamhaus blacklist 
• Could be abused for spamming
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Threats: Privacy
• Web mail, web chat, and forum messages
• Focused on 6,542 messages in English that were 
250 characters or longer 
• Zeitgeist of the Torpig network
– 14% are about jobs/resumes
– 7% discuss money
– 6% are sports fans
– 5% prepare for exams and worry about grades
– 4% partners/sex online
• Online security is a concern, but think they are clean
– 10% specifically mention security/malware
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Password Analysis
• 297,962 unique credentials used on 368,501 web sites 
(domains)
– mostly web mail (Google, live, Yahoo) and social networking 
sites (Facebook, MySpace, netlog.com)
– 28% of the victims reused their password on multiple domains
• Used John the Ripper to assess the strength of the 
passwords
– 173,686 unique passwords
– 56,000 in < 65 minutes using permutation, substitution, etc.
– 14,000 in next 10 minutes using large wordlist
(i.e., 40% cracked in less than 75 minutes)
– another 30,000 in next 24 hours
UC Santa Barbara
23
Password Analysis
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What about?
• Criminal retribution
• Law enforcement
• Repatriating the data
• Ethics, IRB, etc.
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Criminal Retribution
• Big concern on January 25 
– are the criminals going to come to get us?
• More realistically - when will they DDOS our servers?
• Biggest question – why did it take them 10 days to 
download a new DGA?
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Law Enforcement
• We needed to inform law enforcement about this
– who do we notify?
– need someone knowledgeable so they don’t shut us down
• How do we get a hold of law enforcement?
– US CERT gives you a form to fill out
– contacted David Dagon at Ga Tech and got FBI contact
– contacted FBI cybercrime unit
– also contacted DoD defense criminal investigative services
• FBI was very good to work with and gave us lots of 
contacts for repatriation 
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Repatriating the Data
• 8,310 accounts from 410 financial institutions
• 1,660 credit cards from various financial institutions
• Need to mine the information from the raw data files
• Cannot just cold call a bank and say I have 
information that you might want, send me your BINs
• Need introductions from trusted individuals or groups
• FBI and National Cyber-Forensics and Training 
Alliance (NCFTA) were very helpful
– leads to individuals who could handle an entire country
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Ethics
• Recall Principle 1: the sinkholed botnet should be 
operated so that any harm and/or damage to victims 
and targets of attacks would be minimized
• Collected sensitive data that potentially could 
threaten the privacy of victims
• Should emails be viewed at all?
• What about IRB approval?
– not working with human subjects, why would we need it?
– we didn’t plan on getting this kind of data
– any data that can be used to identify an individual needs IRB
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Conclusions
• Unique opportunity to understand 
– potential for profit and malicious activity of botnet’s creators
– characteristics of botnet victims
• Previous evaluations of botnet sizes based on distinct 
IPs may be grossly overestimated
• Botnet victims are users with poorly maintained 
machines and choose easily guessable passwords to 
protect sensitive data
• Interacting with registrars, hosting facilities, victim 
institutions, and law enforcement can be a 
complicated process
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Questions?
